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THE PROHIBITION AGAINST RECOVERING ATTORNEY 
FEES IN MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE:  IT’S TIME FOR 
DELINQUENT DEBTORS TO PAY THE PIPER  
IN NORTH DAKOTA 
ABSTRACT 
 
Shortly before North Dakota entered into statehood, the Legislature for 
the Dakota Territory adopted a statutory prohibition against the collection 
of attorney fees in certain debt instruments.  This statutory prohibition was 
carried over into North Dakota law and has remained materially unchanged 
for well over 100 years.  In its current form, North Dakota Century Code 
section 28-26-04 places a categorical prohibition against any provision in 
certain debt instruments for the collection of attorney fees in the event of 
default.  Included among these debt instruments are mortgages.  Accord-
ingly, North Dakota law prohibits the collection of attorney fees in 
mortgage foreclosure.  This statutory prohibition in conjunction with North 
Dakota’s only available method of foreclosure—judicial foreclosure—and 
anti-deficiency statutes for certain residential mortgage foreclosure has 
created a harsh economic reality for lenders.  As a result, the lender and 
both its current and potential customers are adversely impacted by higher 
costs and a change in lending standards. 
North Dakota remains one of the only states in the union to both 
prohibit the collection of attorney fees in mortgage foreclosure and not 
allow the less expensive and faster method of foreclosure—nonjudicial 
foreclosure.  In order to remedy this disparity between lenders and 
delinquent debtors, North Dakota should reform its foreclosure laws by 
authorizing nonjudicial foreclosure, allowing the collection of reasonable 
attorney fees in judicial foreclosure, and statutorily limiting the collection 
of attorney fees in nonjudicial foreclosure. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Across the United States, one in every 501 homes entered into 
foreclosure in December of 2010.1  During this same time period, the rate of 
homes entering into foreclosure in North Dakota was only one in 10,805.2  
Despite enjoying one of the lowest foreclosure rates in the country, North 
Dakota remains one of the only states in the union that still prohibits 
stipulations in certain debt instruments providing for the collection of 
 
1. See Seth Fiegerman, Why the Midwest Fared Best in the Recession, MAINSTREET.COM 
(Jan. 17, 2011), http://www mainstreet.com/article/moneyinvesting/news/why-the-midwest-fared-
best-in-the-recession. 
2. Id. 
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attorney fees, including home mortgages.3  The prohibition applies even in 
situations where specific provisions for such costs were previously contem-
plated by the mortgagor and mortgagee.4  The rationale for the preclusion of 
such stipulations is that such agreements are “against public policy and 
void.”5 
This note argues the rationale behind North Dakota Century Code 
section 28-26-04 is outdated, archaic, and no longer accurately reflects the 
public policy of North Dakota.  Part II summarily describes the history of 
the statutory prohibition and its underlying rationale.  Part III will provide a 
brief overview of the foreclosure process.  Part IV assesses the direct and 
incidental costs of foreclosure.  Part V describes the limited impact North 
Dakota Century Code section 28-26-04 has had on North Dakota case law.  
Part VI discusses how North Dakota’s neighboring states approach the 
recovery of attorney’s fees in foreclosure actions.  Finally, Part VII con-
cludes that the North Dakota Legislature should reform North Dakota’s 
mortgage foreclosure law in order to equitably protect both mortgagors and 
mortgagees in the foreclosure process. 
II. BACKGROUND OF NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE 
SECTION 28-26-04 
Generally speaking, each party to a civil lawsuit is responsible for 
paying its own attorney fees.6  This principle is known as the “American 
rule.”7  By requiring each party to bear its costs individually in a lawsuit, 
the “American rule” seeks to “avoid stifling legitimate litigation by the 
threat of the specter of burdensome expenses being imposed on an unsuc-
cessful party.”8  In other words, the rule discourages parties from pursuing 
“unnecessary litigation and abuse of the legal system.”9  It also attempts to 
make certain that court proceedings are focused on the actual damages at 
issue because legal costs are only incidental to the matter.10 
 
3. Kenneth J. Warren, Recovering Attorney Fees in Ohio: When Do We Reach the Twentieth 
Century, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 1229, 1233 (1989). 
4. Commercial Bank of Mott v. Stewart, 429 N.W.2d 402, 403 (N.D. 1988) (noting that  
attorney fees can be awarded if agreed to but are limited by North Dakota Century Code section 
28-26-04). 
5. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-04 (2010). 
6. In re Pederson Trust, 2008 ND 210, ¶ 22, 757 N.W.2d 740, 746. 
7. Danzl v. Heidinger, 2004 ND 74, ¶ 6, 677 N.W.2d 924, 926. 
8. 20 AM. JUR. 2D Costs § 55 (2010). 
9. MATT GEHRING, MINN. HOUSE RESEARCH DEP’T, ATTORNEY FEE AWARDS IN 
MINNESOTA STATUTES 1 (2008), available at http://www house.leg.state mn.us/hrd/pubs/ 
attyfee.pdf. 
10. Id. 
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However, there are two exceptions to the “American rule.”11  Either a 
statute must authorize the collection of attorney fees, or the recovery of 
attorney fees must be specifically authorized by a contractual provision.12  
In North Dakota, neither exception exists.  There is no statutory authority 
providing for the collection of attorney fees in mortgage foreclosure 
actions.  In fact, not only does North Dakota not statutorily authorize the 
collection of attorney fees in mortgage foreclosure actions, but it expressly 
prohibits the collection of such fees even if the parties have agreed to 
include the recovery of such fees in the event of default.13  North Dakota 
Century Code section 28-26-04 states 
any provision contained in any note, bond, mortgage, security 
agreement, or other evidence of debt for the payment of an 
attorney’s fee in case of default in payment or in proceedings had 
to collect such note, bond, or evidence of debt, or to foreclose such 
mortgage or security agreement, it is against public policy and 
void.14 
Broadly understood, the statute places a categorical prohibition against 
the collection of attorney fees in most debt instruments.  Accordingly, the 
general rule relating to mortgage foreclosure in North Dakota is that, in the 
absence of any statutory liability, attorney fees incurred by a party in 
litigation are not recoverable as an item of damages. 
A. HISTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE SECTION 28-26-04 
On March 9, 1889, the Dakota Territory adopted a statute,15 which 
provided the basis for North Dakota’s current statutory prohibition16 against 
the collection of attorney fees in most debt instruments.  Around that same 
time, the United States Congress passed the Enabling Act of 1889, which 
authorized certain states to form their own state governments.17  The 
Enabling Act further provided for division of the Dakota Territory into 
 
11. Strand v. Cass Cnty., 2008 ND 149, ¶ 9, 753 N.W.2d 872, 875 (“Generally, under North 
Dakota law, each party to a lawsuit bears its own attorney's fees absent statutory or contractual 
authority.”). 
12. Id. 
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-04 (2010). 
14. Id. 
15. Act of Mar. 7, 1889, ch. 16, § 1, 1889 N.D. Laws 31 (“That any provision contained in 
any note, bond, mortgage or other evidence of debt for the payment of an attorney fee in case of 
default in payment or of proceedings had to collect such note, bond or evidence of debt or to 
foreclose such mortgage is hereby declared to be against public policy and void.”). 
16. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-04. 
17. Enabling Act of Feb. 22, 1889, § 1, 25 Stat. 676 (1889). 
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North Dakota and South Dakota.18  Following the ratification of their 
respective state constitutions and the election of state officers in October of 
1889, North Dakota and South Dakota were officially recognized as states 
in November of that year.19  Both states carried over the laws of the Dakota 
Territory and began the process of adapting those laws into their consti-
tutions and statutory systems.20 
One such law was the original version of North Dakota Century Code 
section 28-26-04, which has remained largely unchanged.  In fact, the only 
material change came in 1965 when the North Dakota Legislature amended 
the statute to include security agreements as another type of debt instrument 
that is precluded from enforcing provisions for the collection of attorney 
fees in the event of default.21  Besides adding security agreements to the list 
of debt instruments, no other material statutory changes have occurred.  In 
fact, a careful reading of the original and current statutes side-by-side shows 
almost no differences. 
B. RATIONALE BEHIND NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE  
SECTION 28-26-04 
The general rule in American jurisprudence is “that courts will not 
enforce illegal contracts.”22  Historically, contracts that violated public 
policy were deemed illegal.23  Naturally, the question arises as to why some 
contracts violate public policy while others do not.  The basic under-
standing in the late nineteenth century was that if a contract “conflicts with 
the morals of the time, and contravenes any established interest of society, 
it is void, as being against public policy.”24  Today, commentators have 
acknowledged the difficulty of defining just exactly what public policy 
means in context of illegal contracts but generally understand it to mean 
“no person can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to the 
public good.”25  Based on those two understandings, the “interest of the 
public good” appears to be the primary standard for assessing the voida-
bility of contracts on public policy grounds. 
 
18. Enabling Act § 2. 
19. CLEMENT A. LOUNSBERRY, EARLY HISTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA:  ESSENTIAL 
OUTLINES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 415 (1919). 
20. Id. at 449-50. 
21. 1965 N.D. Laws 296. 
22. 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 280 (1999). 
23. WILLIAM W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 674 (5th ed. 1874). 
24. Id. 
25. 17A C.J.S., supra note 22, § 215. 
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The mere existence of North Dakota Century Code section 28-26-04 
raises two interesting and important questions relating to the evolution of 
public policy.  First, when the statute in its original form was adopted, why 
was the collection of attorney fees in debt instruments against public 
policy?  Second, and more importantly, does the statute, in its current form, 
violate the public policy concerns of today? 
Because no direct authority exists26 regarding the underlying public 
policy concerns for the statutory prohibition against the collection of 
attorney fees in debt instruments when first adopted by the Territorial 
Legislature, one can only speculate as to the driving force behind the enact-
ment of the statute.  However, the answer to the second question is less 
tenuous because we, as a society, say what the public policy concerns are 
for the day.  When considering whether or not section 28-26-04 violates 
public policy today, one can arrive at one of two conclusions.  Either the 
collection of attorney fees has the tendency to be injurious to the public 
good, or section 28-26-04 is based on archaic ideals and no longer reflects 
the present public policy concerns of North Dakota.  If the public policy of 
every other state in the union can be used as a litmus test for determining 
the public policy of North Dakota, the latter answer is likely more accurate. 
III. THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS 
A “mortgage is the most common real estate security” used for 
obtaining and financing real estate.27  The underlying purpose of fore-
closure is to have the mortgaged property applied to a mortgagor’s debt 
with the hopes of satisfying that debt, or at least a substantial portion 
thereof.28  Foreclosure is generally only limited by the rules of equity in that 
when there is default on a debt secured by a mortgage, the mortgagee 
should be made whole.29  However, it is also understood under the rules of 
equity that the mortgagee should not be made better off than if the agree-
ment had been fully performed.30 
In a conventional residential mortgage foreclosure, the process of fore-
closure is governed by the type of foreclosure being employed and on the 
state law governing that foreclosure.  In a typical residential mortgage, two 
 
26. There are no extant legislative history records from the Territorial Legislature. 
27. 1 WILLIAM HOUSTON BROWN, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 8:3 (2002). 
28. 55 AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 573 (2010). 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
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primary parties are present:  the mortgagor and the mortgagee.31  The 
mortgagor is often an individual seeking to purchase property, and a 
mortgage is often the necessary security device used when the individual 
needs to borrow funds from a lender in order to make the purchase.32  The 
individual, or mortgagor, then enters into a mortgage agreement with the 
mortgagee, most often a lender.33 
The mortgage agreement functions as the legal basis of security for the 
mortgagee.  By entering into such an agreement, the mortgagee gains a 
legal interest in the purchased property for the sole purpose of protecting its 
investment.34  Said another way, the mortgage functions as a consensual 
lien on the property in favor of the mortgagee.  If the mortgagor defaults on 
the mortgage agreement, the mortgagee has the right to claim title of the 
property and sell it to satisfy the mortgagor’s remaining debt on the 
property.35  This process is referred to as foreclosure.  In most states, there 
exist two types of foreclosures: judicial foreclosure and nonjudicial 
foreclosure.36 
A. JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE 
Judicial foreclosure is a type of foreclosure supervised by the courts 
and sometimes involves the intervention of the court, hence the name 
“judicial” foreclosure.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines judicial foreclosure 
as “[a] costly and time-consuming foreclosure method by which the 
mortgaged property is sold through a court proceeding requiring many 
standard legal steps such as the filing of a complaint, service of process, 
notice, and a hearing.”37  All states permit judicial foreclosure, and some 
states require it.38  For example, North Dakota forbids private lenders from 
foreclosing by sale.39  Consequently, in North Dakota, lenders are required 
 
31. Eric M. Marshall, The Protective Scope of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act: 
Providing Mortgagors the Protection They Deserve from Abusive Foreclosure Practices, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 1269, 1273 (2010). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. 55 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 28, § 573. 
35. Id. 
36. Marshall, supra note 31, at 1273. 
37. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 719 (9th ed. 2009). 
38. Id. 
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-22-01 (2010) (“Every mortgage of real property held by the state 
or any of its agencies, departments, or instrumentalities, containing a power of sale, upon default 
being made in the conditions of such mortgage, may be foreclosed by advertisement in the manner 
provided by law.  No other mortgage of real property shall be so foreclosed, but must be 
foreclosed by action.”) (emphasis added). 
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to foreclose upon property using the costly and time-consuming method of 
judicial foreclosure. 
Judicial foreclosure is initiated by the mortgagee when a mortgagor 
defaults on the mortgage agreement.40  In order to recover the debt owed by 
the mortgagor, the mortgagee must file a lawsuit against the mortgagor and 
any other parties who have an interest in the secured property.41  The 
mortgagee files complaint as well as a notice of Lis Pendens.42  The 
complaint contains information about the mortgage agreement and 
describes how the mortgagor has defaulted on the agreement.43  Also 
outlined within the complaint is the amount of debt owed by the mortgagor 
and those named as defendants by the mortgagee, often the mortgagor and 
any third party with interest in the property.44  All parties are then served a 
notice of the complaint either directly or publicly, and litigation proceeds.45 
To satisfy the debt, the lender has the right to recover funds from the 
secured property.46  In the process of judicial foreclosure, it is the court’s 
responsibility to first determine if the mortgagee is entitled to foreclosure.47  
If foreclosure is granted, the court then orders a sheriff’s sale to auction off 
the property.48 The court then decides how the proceeds from the property 
sale will be distributed to satisfy the debt.49 
B. NONJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE 
Nonjudicial foreclosure includes power-of-sale foreclosure, foreclosure 
by advertisement, and voluntary nonjudicial foreclosure.50  Nonjudicial 
foreclosure is almost always faster and less expensive than judicial fore-
closure.51  It is less expensive primarily because formal legal representation 
is not required for judicial proceedings and it is typically a faster method of 
 
40. Marshall, supra note 31, at 1273. 
41. Id. (citing Christopher A. Camardello, Understanding Foreclosure on Real 
Property, BENCH & B. MINN., Oct. 2008, at 20-21). 
42. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Lis Pendens § 1 (2010) (‘Lis pendens’ is a common-law and statutory 
doctrine which has the effect of providing constructive notice to the world of an alleged claim of a 
lien or an interest in property.  A properly filed notice of lis pendens places a subsequent 
purchaser of the affected real estate on notice of the interest asserted in the lis pendens.”). 
43. Marshall, supra note 31, at 1273. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. 55 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 28, § 573. 
47. Marshall, supra note 31, at 1273. 
48. Id. at 1273-74. 
49. Id. 
50. See, e.g., 2 BAXTER DUNAWAY, L. DISTRESSED REAL EST. app.19A (2010). 
51. See 5 id. § 68:7. 
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foreclosure.  As a result, lenders incur less administrative expenses during 
the foreclosure process. 
Many states allow nonjudicial foreclosure as an alternative to judicial 
foreclosure because it provides a way to avoid the delay and expense of 
judicial proceedings.52  In fact, most states have adopted statutes explicitly 
authorizing types of nonjudicial foreclosure.53  In order to nonjudicially 
foreclose, the mortgage must either contain a power of sale clause or a con-
tractual right that grants the mortgagee the legal ability to sell the property, 
or the right must be implied by law.54 
In sum, under the nonjudicial foreclosure process, the lender is 
authorized by law or contract to foreclose on the mortgaged property in the 
event of default in order to satisfy the mortgagor’s outstanding obligation 
without the formalities of judicial proceedings.  Because nonjudicial fore-
closure is less expensive and faster, it often functions as a desirable 
alternative to judicial foreclosure from a lender’s perspective. 
IV. DIRECT AND INCIDENTAL FORECLOSURE COSTS 
When a mortgagor defaults on his or her mortgage payments, lenders 
incur substantial costs through the delinquency period, the foreclosure 
process, and the post-foreclosure process.55  In fact, lenders begin incurring 
costs the very moment a borrower stops making their mortgage payments.56  
Because most of the costs associated with loan default are time-dependent, 
a lender’s expense continues to grow until the mortgagor either satisfies the 
debt or when foreclosure is sought by the mortgagee and that process is 
completed.57 
When a debtor becomes delinquent on a loan, the lender loses out on 
income from stopped principle payments, interest payments, and servicing 
fees.58  Additional costs that begin to accrue once the loan becomes delin-
quent include increased servicing costs and collection fees.59  In addition, 
the lender becomes responsible for maintaining the property if the debtor is 
 
52. See Soufal v. Griffin, 198 N.W. 807, 809 (Minn. 1924). 
53. See infra Part VI (explaining that most states utilize nonjudicial foreclosures). 
54. 1 BROWN, supra note 27, § 8:17. 
55. MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, CONGRESSIONAL EDUCATION SERIES BRIEFING:  LENDER’S 
COST OF FORECLOSURE 4-5 (May 28, 2008), available at http://www nga.org/Files/pdf/ 
0805foreclosuremortgage.pdf. 
56. Id. at 4. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 5. 
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not doing so himself.60  Costs associated with maintaining the property 
include property maintenance, tax payments, and insurance payments.61 
When seeking foreclosure, the lender is then faced with the legal and 
administrative costs associated with foreclosure and post-foreclosure.  
These costs include, but are not limited to, court fees, attorney fees, fees to 
publicize foreclosure notices, auctioneer fees, and title fees.62  After the 
property sale, the lender may even take another financial loss if the 
principle from the sale is less than the outstanding debt owed by the 
debtor.63  As a result of these collected losses and accrued costs, lenders are 
forced to pass the costs off onto its current and future customers and change 
its lending standards.64  These changes do not benefit the general public and 
make mortgage lending a less consumer-friendly practice. 
In examining the costs incurred by mortgage lenders in the event of 
loan delinquency and foreclosure, it is evident the extent of costs accrued 
would differ depending on whether the foreclosure was judicial or 
nonjudicial.  With costs being time-dependent, it is safe to assume that a 
judicial foreclosure would increase costs for the lender.  This might be 
assumed not only because of the often-increased time needed to complete 
the foreclosure, but also on account of the direct costs associated with 
entering into a legal proceeding itself.  Another major consideration for 
lenders is the fact that a personal bankruptcy proceeding often accompanies 
foreclosure.65  As a result, legal costs soar even higher because the lender 
must also acquire legal representation for that proceeding in order to 
enforce its rights to the property. 
In 2007, the Joint Economic Committee released a report stating the 
average foreclosure costs approximately $77,935.66  Of the total cost, local 
governments incur $19,227 in lost property taxes, unpaid utility bills, 
property, upkeep, sewage, and maintenance.67  Neighboring homeowners 
lose approximately $1508 on their home values.68  Foreclosure results in 
$7200 in legal and administrative costs for the homeowner.69  Lastly, 
 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 4-5.  
62. Id. 
63. Id. at 5. 
64. JOINT ECON. COMM., SHELTERING NEIGHBORHOODS FROM THE SUBPRIME 
FORECLOSURE STORM 14 (Apr. 2007), available at http://jec.senate.gov/public/?a=Files. 
Serve&File_id=8c3884e5-2641-4228-af85-b61f8a677c28. 
65. MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, supra note 55, at 5. 
66. JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 64, at 16. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 14. 
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lenders bear the brunt of the cost, averaging $50,000 in legal and 
administrative expenses.70 
Because lenders have incurred an overwhelming majority of the costs 
associated with mortgage foreclosure, they have had to change their lending 
standards.71  Consequently, customers and potential customers are ad-
versely affected by higher fees and rates and increased difficulties in 
obtaining financing.72  It stands to reason that because lenders incur most of 
the cost associated with foreclosure and because the mortgagor is almost 
always the breaching party, lenders should be permitted to recover their 
legal costs in order to mitigate their losses for the benefit of the general 
public.   
V. THE IMPACT OF NORTH DAKOTA CENTURY CODE SECTION 
28-26-04 ON THE MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE PROCESS IN 
NORTH DAKOTA 
North Dakota has deemed provisions for the recovery of attorney fees 
in loan agreements “void and against public policy” since its inception as a 
state.  The statutory prohibition has had a lasting impact on residential 
mortgage foreclosure in North Dakota.  The impact has been nothing less 
than a strict categorical prohibition against the recovery of legal costs in 
foreclosure for well over 100 years.  In fact, aside from the statutory change 
relating to security agreements in 1965, North Dakota Century Code section 
28-26-04 has undergone only one major development in North Dakota case 
law, at least with respect to mortgages. 
Late in March of 1983, Joe and Magdelena Obrigewitch 
(Obrigewitchs) executed a mortgage as security for their debt with 
Production Credit Association of Mandan (PCA).73  In June of that same 
year, the parties entered into another loan agreement, which established the 
terms and conditions for the repayment of the debt.74  Nearly four years 
later, in October of 1987, the Obrigwitchs entered into yet another loan 
agreement to supplement their previous two agreements with PCA.75  In 
this new contract, they agreed to pay PCA the outstanding principal balance 
on their debt by February 1, 1988.76  The Obrigwitchs failed to adhere to 
 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. (“Indeed, substantial losses have led many of these lenders to tighten their lending 
standards, which will make it even more difficult for families facing foreclosure to refinance their 
homes, or purchase another if they have already foreclosed.”). 
73. Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Obrigewitch, 462 N.W.2d 115, 116 (N.D. 1990). 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
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the terms of this supplementary agreement.77  Consequently, PCA initiated 
an action to foreclose on the Obrigwitchs’ mortgage and eventually 
obtained default judgment.78  The Obrigwitchs appealed arguing, among 
other things, a provision in the first loan agreement, which provided for the 
recovery of legal costs in the event of default, rendered the entire agreement 
void.79 
Two years before the Obrigwitchs’ case was appealed to the North 
Dakota Supreme Court, an argument similar to the Obrigwitchs was 
advanced by a consumer involved in a retail contract dispute in Commercial 
Bank of Mott v. Stewart.80  In that case, James Stewart (Stewart) executed a 
retail installment contract with an automotive dealership for the purchase of 
a car.81  The retail installment contract granted the seller a security interest 
in the car, and the contract was subsequently assigned to the Commercial 
Bank of Mott (CBM).82  Not long after executing the installment contract, 
Stewart defaulted on the car payments, and CBM obtained default judgment 
against him.83  Stewart appealed from default judgment, arguing, among 
other things, that the default judgment was defective due to the fact that it 
authorized the recovery of legal expenses out of the sale of the collateral.84 
The Supreme Court of North Dakota agreed with Stewart’s argument, 
concluding that the trial court erred by authorizing the recovery of 
attorney’s fees.85  The court, however, disagreed with Stewart on whether 
the default judgment was entirely defective as a result of that error.86  The 
court reasoned North Dakota Century Code section 28-26-04 merely limits 
an agreement to not allowing for the recovery of attorney’s fees but does 
not void the entire agreement itself.87  In other words, the court ruled only 
the authorization of the recovery of attorney fees was void, not the entire 
agreement. 
The decision in Mott set the stage for a predictable outcome in 
Production Credit Association of Mandan v. Obrigwitch.88  Relying solely 
on its holding in Mott, the court rejected the Obrigwitchs’ argument with 
 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 116-17. 
79. Id. at 118. 
80. 429 N.W.2d 402 (N.D. 1988). 
81. Stewart, 429 N.W.2d at 402. 
82. Id.  
83. Id. at 402-03. 
84. Id. at 403. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. 
87. See id. 
88. 462 N.W.2d 115 (N.D. 1990). 
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almost no discussion and held that North Dakota Century Code section 28-
26-04 voided only the provision for attorney fees in the loan agreement, not 
the entire loan agreement.89  Thus, the ruling in Obrigwitch accurately 
reflects the only development and the current state of affairs relating to the 
recovery of legal expenses in mortgage foreclosure actions in North Dakota. 
VI. OVERVIEW OF THE RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES IN 
RESIDENTIAL FORECLOSURE IN NORTH DAKOTA, 
MINNESOTA, SOUTH DAKOTA, AND MONTANA 
All states in the United States allow judicial foreclosure in private 
residential foreclosure.90  About half of the states also permit nonjudicial 
foreclosure.91  North Dakota is not one of these states.92  Moreover, of the 
 
89. Obrigwitch, 462 N.W.2d at 118. 
90. See ALA. CODE § 35-10-3 (Supp. 2010); ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.170 (2010); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 33-721 (2007 & Supp. 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 18-49-103 to -105 (2003); CAL. 
CIV. CODE §§ 2924 to 2924l (Deering 2005 & Supp. 2011); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-39-101 
(2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-1 to -31 (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5061(a) 
(1999); FLA. STAT. §§ 702.01, 45.031 (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-49 (2002); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 667-1 (1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1502 (Supp. 2011); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 
5/15-1501 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-29-1-3 (West 2002); IOWA CODE § 654.1 (2009); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2410 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 426.525 (West 2006); LA. CODE 
CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 3721 to 3753 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6321 (2003); MD. 
CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105 (LexisNexis 2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244, § 1 (West 
2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.3101 to 600.3180 (West 2010 & Supp. 2011); MINN. 
STAT. § 581.01 (2010); MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-1-55 (1999); MO. ANN. STAT. § 443.190 (West 
2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222 (2011); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-2137 (2008); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 40.430 (LexisNexis 2006 & Supp. 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 479.10 (2001); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:50-1 to -21 (2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-5-1 (West 2010); N.Y. REAL 
PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 1301-1391 (Consol. 1981 & Supp. 2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-4 to -
21.33 (2009 & Supp. 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-01 (2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2323.07 (West 2004); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 686 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 88.010 (West 
2003); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1680.402c (West 2003 & Supp. 2011); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-27-1 
(1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-630 (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-47-1 (2004); TENN. CODE 
ANN. §§ 35-5-101 to -112 (2007 & Supp. 2010); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.005 (West 2010); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-901 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4526 (2002); 
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-59 to -66.6 (2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12.040 (LexisNexis 
2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-12-1 (LexisNexis 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 846.01 (West 2007); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-18-101 (2011). 
91. See ALA. CODE § 35-10-12; ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.070; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-
807; ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-50-108; CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 38-38-100.3 
to -114; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-1 to -31; GA. CODE ANN. § 44-14-162; HAW. REV. STAT. 
§ 667-5; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 45-1505; IOWA CODE § 654.18; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 
6203-A; MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-105; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 244, § 14 (2010); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.3201 to .3280; MINN. STAT. § 580.01; MISS. CODE ANN. § 89-
1-55; MO. ANN. STAT. § 443.290; MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-313 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 76-
1001 to -1018 (2009 & Supp. 2010) (deeds of trust only); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.080 
(LexisNexis 2007 & Supp. 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 479.25; N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW 
§§ 1301-1391; N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-4 to -21.33; OKLA. STAT. tit. 46, § 43 (2001); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 86.735; R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-22 (Supp. 2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §  21-48-1; 
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 35-5-101 to -112; TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 51.005; UTAH CODE ANN. § 
57-1-24 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4531a (Supp. 2010); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-59 to -66.6; 
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states that permit only judicial foreclosure, North Dakota is one of the only 
remaining to place a categorical prohibition against the recovery of attorney 
fees in debt instruments.93  Therefore, not only does North Dakota law 
prohibit lenders from recovering the legal costs associated with foreclosure, 
it also precludes a lender from availing itself of the faster and less 
expensive method of foreclosure, nonjudicial foreclosure. 
Adding insult to injury, North Dakota also forbids mortgagors from 
obtaining deficiency judgments in many residential mortgage fore-
closures.94  As a result, the current mortgage foreclosure landscape in North 
Dakota provides a no-win situation for lenders. 
In contrast, North Dakota’s neighboring states have more amenable 
statutory procedures and less harsh restrictions for lenders who foreclose on 
delinquent debtors.  Yet, at the same time, each state’s statutory procedures 
and limitations on the collection of attorney fees are very different.  
Regardless of their differences, each state’s foreclosure laws create a 
friendlier environment for lenders than the mortgage law landscape in North 
Dakota.  Of significant relevance is South Dakota’s statutory foreclosure 
system because it shows how South Dakota overcame the statutory pro-
hibition adopted by the Dakota Territory.  In addition, both Montana and 
Minnesota’s statutory limitations on the collection of attorney fees are 
relevant for North Dakota’s consideration because they provide two 
different but equitable approaches to the recovery of attorney fees in non-
judicial foreclosure. 
A. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES IN SOUTH DAKOTA 
South Dakota is similar to North Dakota in that it authorizes lenders to 
initiate foreclosure by the judicial foreclosure process.95  However, unlike 
North Dakota, South Dakota law does permit lenders to initiate foreclosure 
by the nonjudicial foreclosure process if a “power of sale” clause is 
included within the mortgage agreement.96  The “power of sale” clause is 
necessary to initiate nonjudicial foreclosure because it authorizes the lender 
 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.030; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 38-1-3 (LexisNexis 2005).  But see 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 34-4-102(a); 1 EDWARD J. PRONLEY, WISCONSIN PRACTICE SERIES: 
METHODS OF PRACTICE § 7.2 (4th ed. 2010) (“Despite the repeal of the nonjudicial foreclosure 
procedure in Wisconsin, it seems all mortgages used in Wisconsin still contain a power of sale 
clause.”). 
92. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 35-22-01 (2004).  North Dakota law only permits the state, or 
state agencies, to foreclose by advertisement.  Id. 
93. See Warren, supra note 3, at 1233.  
94. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-03 (forbidding deficiency judgments for mortgage 
foreclosures on residential property of four or less units). 
95. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-47-1. 
96. Id. § 21-48-1. 
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to sell the property to satisfy the balance due in the event of default.  In 
sum, South Dakota allows mortgagees to foreclosure nonjudicially only if 
the contract provides for nonjudicial foreclosure, as opposed to a system 
that permits nonjudicial foreclosure even if the contract does not provide for 
it. 
Also similar to North Dakota, South Dakota carried over into its laws 
the prohibition against the collection of attorney fees which had previously 
been enacted by the Territorial Legislature in 1889.97  However, unlike 
North Dakota, South Dakota has materially altered their statute and, as a 
result, now permits the recovery of attorney fees in mortgage foreclosure.98  
Accordingly, attorney fees are now recoverable in both judicial and 
nonjudicial foreclosures in South Dakota and they are limited only by the 
court’s discretion.99 
B. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES IN MONTANA 
Montana’s foreclosure laws are in many ways similar to those of South 
Dakota.  For example, Montana allows lenders to foreclose on deeds of 
trust or mortgages in default by either judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure.100  
One of the major differences between the South Dakota and Montana 
foreclosure processes is the limitation each state places on deficiency judg-
ments.  In South Dakota, deficiency judgments are permitted in most cases 
with the exception of where the mortgage is foreclosed by nonjudicial 
voluntary procedure.101  In contrast, Montana does not permit deficiency 
judgments following nonjudicial foreclosure.102 Rather, deficiency judg-
ments are available to mortgagors only if judicial foreclosure is utilized.103 
Another difference between the foreclosure laws in South Dakota and 
Montana is the amount of attorney’s fees that are recoverable in the event of 
default.  Montana, like South Dakota, authorizes the court to award 
reasonable attorney fees in judicial foreclosure.104  However, unlike South 
 
97. Id. § 15-17-39. 
98. See 1993 S.D. Sess. Laws 221; see also infra Part VII. 
99. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-17-38 (“Attorney fees may be taxed as disbursements on 
mortgage foreclosures either by action or advertisement.”). 
100. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 71-1-222, -313 (2011). 
101. See id. § 21-48A-1(2).  Nonjudicial voluntary foreclosure is different than judicial and 
nonjudicial foreclosure in that the foreclosure is not forced by the mortgagee.  Rather, the parties 
mutually agree to foreclose.  In effect, the mortgagor gives up all interest in the property, and the 
mortgagor waives any rights to a deficiency judgment.  Id. 
102. Id. § 71-1-317. 
103. See id. § 71-1-305.  But see id. § 71-1-232 (forbidding deficiency judgments in judicial 
foreclosure where the parties had executed a purchase money mortgage). 
104. Id. § 15-17-38 (“Attorney fees may be taxed as disbursements on mortgage foreclosures 
either by action or advertisement.”). 
          
270 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87:255 
Dakota, Montana limits the recovery of legal costs in nonjudicial fore-
closure to reasonable attorney fees “not [to] exceed, in the aggregate, [five 
percent] of the amount due on the obligation, both principal and 
interest . . . .”105  For example, if a home with the remaining obligation of 
$150,000 is nonjudicially foreclosed upon, the lender may recover a maxi-
mum of $7,500 in attorney fees under Montana law.  In sum, a lender in 
Montana or South Dakota has the option to foreclose by the method of 
either judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure and may also be permitted to 
recover a substantial amount of attorney’s fees associated with the 
foreclosure. 
C. RECOVERY OF ATTORNEY FEES IN MINNESOTA 
Minnesota foreclosure law is similar to both South Dakota and 
Montana in that it too permits both judicial106 and nonjudicial107 
foreclosure, and because it allows deficiency judgments in foreclosures.108 
Minnesota also allows the recovery of attorney fees in judicial and 
nonjudicial foreclosure.109  In judicial foreclosure, the court establishes and 
limits the award of attorney fees using its discretion.  When determining the 
fee, the courts in Minnesota consider time spent on the matter, abilities and 
experience of the attorneys, the disputed amount involved, responsibilities 
assumed by the attorneys, and the results of the foreclosure.110  
Accordingly, when judicial foreclosure is used in Minnesota, attorney fees 
are limited only by the court’s discretion. 
On the other hand, nonjudicial foreclosure has an objective statutory 
limitation in Minnesota.  Like Montana, Minnesota statutorily limits the 
recovery of legal costs in nonjudicial foreclosures.111  While Montana limits 
the recovery of attorney fees to five percent of the remaining obligation, 
Minnesota limits the recovery using certain statutory fees established by a 
sliding scale relating the original principal of the loan. 
Specifically, the statutory fees are based on the amount of debt secured 
by the mortgage and the date the mortgage was executed.112  For example, 
for mortgages executed after May 31, 1971, where the original principle 
 
105. Id. § 71-1-320. 
106. See MINN. STAT. § 581.01 (2010). 
107. See id. 
108. See id. § 582.30(1).  But see id. § 582.30(2) (not allowing deficiency judgments where 
nonjudicial foreclosures have a redemption period of less than six months). 
109. Id. § 481.02(4). 
110. STEVEN J KIRSCH, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: METHODS OF PRACTICE § 50.7 (3d ed. 
2009). 
111. See MINN. STAT. § 582.01; see also KIRSCH, supra note 110, § 49.25. 
112. See MINN. STAT. § 582.01; see also KIRSCH, supra note 110, § 49.25. 
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amount secured by the mortgage exceeds $10,000, the maximum allowance 
for attorney fees in nonjudicial foreclosure is $275, plus $35 for each 
additional $5000 of the original principal amount.  The minimum amount of 
attorney fees available in nonjudicial foreclosure for mortgages executed 
after July 31, 1992 has been updated to $500.  Thus, if a lender borrowed 
$150,000 to a mortgagor after July 31, 1992 and then foreclosed under the 
nonjudicial foreclosure process sometime after, it would be entitled to an 
amount not to exceed $1480.113 
In sum, Minnesota law permits both judicial and nonjudicial 
foreclosure.  In the event a lender forecloses using judicial foreclosure, it 
would be allowed to recover reasonable attorney fees which would be 
established and limited by the court’s discretion.  In the event a lender fore-
closes using nonjudicial foreclosure, it would be entitled to the award of 
attorney fees not to exceed the statutory limitations determined by a sliding 
scale based on the original principle amount secured by the mortgage and 
the date the mortgage was executed. 
VII. PROPOSAL TO REFORM MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE LAWS IN 
NORTH DAKOTA 
Lenders incur substantial losses when delinquent debtors default on 
their mortgages.  As a consequence, lenders change their lending strategies 
and pass on those costs to other customers.  To mitigate their losses, lenders 
avail themselves of the foreclosure processes that best protect their business 
interests in a given situation.  Under the current law in North Dakota, 
lenders are limited to one foreclosure process—judicial foreclosure—which 
is the slower and more expensive method of foreclosure.  In addition, North 
Dakota remains the only state in the union to categorically prohibit the 
recovery of legal costs in all methods of mortgage foreclosure.114 
That said, it is time for delinquent debtors to pay the piper in North 
Dakota.  North Dakota’s foreclosure laws should be modernized and made 
more amicable to lenders.  This modernization would include two minor 
reforms that would have a substantial impact on North Dakota’s foreclosure 
landscape.  First, North Dakota should follow South Dakota’s lead and 
amend its statute to allow for exceptions for the collection of attorney fees 
in certain debt instruments.  Second, North Dakota should adopt a statutory 
 
113. See MINN. STAT. § 582.01.  The amount recoverable is not to exceed $500 for the first 
$10,000 of the original principal secured by the mortgage plus $35 for each additional $5000 of 
the principal. 
114. See discussion supra Part IV. 
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procedure allowing nonjudicial foreclosure since they are faster and less 
expensive. 
When the South Dakota Legislature amended its prohibition against the 
collection of attorney fees in debt instrument by adding the qualifying 
phrase “except as elsewhere authorized,” South Dakota’s foreclosure laws 
drastically changed.  One year earlier, South Dakota “elsewhere authorized” 
the collection of attorney fees in mortgage foreclosure, resulting in a more 
equitable environment for lenders in the state. 
Accordingly, amending North Dakota Century Code section 28-26-04 
by adding the qualifying phrase “except as elsewhere authorized,” or its 
functional equivalent, would be the first step to permitting the collection of 
attorney fees in mortgage foreclosure.  The second step involves statutorily 
authorizing courts to award reasonable attorney’s fees in judicial 
foreclosure actions.  The final step would include adopting a statutory 
procedure for nonjudicial foreclosure which reasonably limits the recovery 
of legal costs similar to the systems in South Dakota,115 Montana,116 or 
Minnesota.117  If these three minor revisions are made, it would simul-
taneously modernize and beneficially change the mortgage foreclosure 
landscape in North Dakota for lenders and the general public. 
Stephen D. Larson* 
 
115. South Dakota limits the recovery of legal costs in nonjudicial foreclosure by the court’s 
discretion.  See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-17-38 (2010). 
116. Montana limits the recovery of legal costs in nonjudicial foreclosure based on the 
outstanding debt obligation.  See MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-320 (2011). 
117. Minnesota limits the recovery of legal costs in nonjudicial foreclosure by a statutory 
schedule based on the original principal amount of the mortgage.  See MINN. STAT. § 582.01. 
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